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BILLS AND NoTEs-lNDonsEMENT "Fon DEPOSIT ONLY"-EPPECT ON NEGOTIABILITY-Defendant, in payment for goods purchased, drew two checks payable
to W which W indorsed "pay to order of plaintiff bank for deposit only" and
deposited with plaintiff. Plaintiff credited W's account with the amount of the
checks, which sum was immediately withdrawn. Defendant then stopped payment of the checks as W failed to deliver the goods purchased; and, since W was
bankrupt, plaintiff sought to recover the amount of the checks from defendant.
Defendant sought to assert a defense which was good against W, on the theory
that plaintiff, as restrictive indorsee, was merely a trustee for W and not a holder
in due course. Held,. the trial court ,vas correct in finding that plaintiff was a
holder in due course. Rubio Sau. Bank of Brighton v. Acme Farm Proditcts Co.,
(Iowa 1949) 37 N.W. (2d) 16.
It has been settled in those states1 which have adopted the Bank Collection

1 For a list of the 18 states, see
6th ed., 24 (1938).
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Code that an indorsement "for deposit only" is restrictive and passes no title to the
indorsee.2 A similar degree of certainty has not resulted from the adoption of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, however, as the provisions8 therein dealing with restrictive indorsements leave this question open.4 In those states in
which an indorsement "for deposit only" has been held restrictive, 5 it becomes
important to determine whether one who takes under a restrictive indorsement
can qualify as a holder in due course. Several courts have specifically answered
this question in the negative.6 This position has been strongly criticized,7 however, and the special facts of particular cases have been seized upon to permit
recovery, or the successful use of a defense, available only to a holder in due course,
by a restrictive indorsee. 8 Other courts, in accord with the principal case, have held
that an indorsement "for deposit only" is not restrictive. 9 These decisions eliminate
the necessity of an inquiry into the indorsee's ability to qualify as a holder in due
course; and it has been ably argued that this result is most consistent with the
indorser's intent.10 It is submitted that the serious consideration is not so much
whether this particular indorsement is held restrictive or non-restrictive, but that
the policy behind the N.I.L. which favors uniform results under the law applicable to negotiable instruments is not being effectuated in this area. It is doubtful
that the goal of uniformity will be realized with respect to indorsements "for
deposit only" until either the Bank Collection Code finds universal acceptance or
the N.I.L. is clarified by amendment.
Stephen A. Bryant, S.Ed.

Bank Collection Code, §4.
a N.I.L. §§36, 37 and 47.
4 For a discussion of these provisions and cases involving indorsements "for deposit only,"
see 27 MicH. L. R.Bv. 333 (1929); 37 MICH. L. RBv. 473 (193~). On restrictive indorsements
in general, see Chafee, "Remarks on Restrictive Indorsements," 58 HARv. L. R.Bv. 1182
(1945). See also 52 YALE L.J. 890 (1943).
5 The cases are collected in B11:aTI!L's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 7th ·
ed., 613 (1948).
6 Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919); Union
Trust Co. v. Matthews, 258 Mich. 433, 242 N.W. 781 (1931); Fidelity and Deposit Co. of
Md. v. Marion National Bank, 116 Ind. App. 453, 64 N.E. (2d) 583 (1946).
7 BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INsTRuMENTs LAw, 7th ed., 615-618 (1948).
s Continental Nat. Bank v. Stirling, 65 Idaho 123, 140 P. (2d) 230 (1943); Atlantic
City Nat. Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 107 N.J.L. 492, 155 A. 762 (1931).
9 Midwest Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Niles and Watters Sav. Bank, 190 Iowa 752,
180 N.W. 880 (1921); Boston-Continental Nat. Bank v. Hub Fruit Co., 285 Mass: 187, 189
N.E. 89 (1934); People ex rel. Nelson v. Sheridan Trust and Savings Bank, 358 Ill. 290,
193 N.E. 186 (1934).
10 27 Mica. L. R.Bv. 333 (1929).
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